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Abstract 
Minilateral arrangements are increasingly prevalent in global politics. Informal, non-
binding coalitions of the interested are becoming the new multilateral. This phenomenon 
arises within the framework of a growing multipolar world, with rising powers acquiring 
new capacity and responsibility as leaders and norm challengers/setters in international 
regimes. This approach to international negotiation sits well with China’s tradition of 
coalition forming through informal negotiations with ‘like-minded states’. This paper 
examines China’s participation strategies in the non-traditional security issues of climate 
change and global finance to demonstrate how China is assuming its rise in a peaceful, un-
threatening way. Shifting between the convenient identities of a ‘developing country’ of 
the global South and a ‘rising power’ with influential powers in shaping international 
norms, these minilateral arrangements allow China to adopt various identities and 
maximize its interests internationally. China seeks to be perceived domestically and 
internationally as an economically sustainable and environmentally responsible power. In 
the cases of climate change and global finance China is leading a number of sub-groupings 
that hinder other countries of the global South from participating at the high table of 
climate change negotiations and economic global governance. Examples of this are varied. 
Among them are the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) of states within 
global negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC); and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the Group of 20 
(G20), the BRICS (including the New Development Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, BRI).  
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Introduction  
 
 
With the rise of China and increasing importance of the country in international relations, significant 
changes are taking place in the way in which Beijing behaves amidst key international regimes.1 This is 
particularly so in what concerns economic regimes, as economic development and political legitimacy 
are inherently linked for the Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter CCP). This remains a sensitive issue 
in Chinese politics, particularly since the dwindling legitimacy of the CCP under the past two 
leaderships.2  
 
Within the international regimes that are linked with economic development, the cases of climate 
change and global finance stand out. Both fields are rapidly evolving with on-going reforms and 
crossroad negotiations, making them attractive to rising powers such as China.3 There is growing space 
for emerging powers to come into the traditional ‘sphere of influence’ of the so-called traditional 
powers.   
 
In climate change, the Paris Agreement (2015) that came into force in November 2016, constitutes a 
landmark agreement, in which China played an unprecedented role. This had been preceded by the 
seminal Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which was in dire need of updating to reflect the needs of the times. 
The UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC signed in 1992), is an umbrella 
convention which provides a framework for formal and informal agreements. The agreements that 
preceded Paris were: the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), the Cancun 
Agreement (2010) and the Durban Platform (2011). This framework structure of the convention allows 
for regulatory evolution and policy change to be gradually incorporated into agreements on climate 
change, making it also one that is particularly attractive to rising powers.  
 
In terms of global finance, there are a variety of mushrooming institutions such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the G20 that are changing the rules of the game. Bretton 
Woods institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—themselves going 
through structural reform processes, risk becoming obsolete. These shifts are further reflected in global 
financial investment and foreign aid patterns, which increasingly bear the imprint of rising powers.  
 
Against this background, Beijing is exercising a strategic form of responsibility internationally in a way 
that its domestic economic development is not hindered.  Climate change and global finance epitomise 
well how China is re-adapting its approach to multilateral fora and international politics to make the 
most of it. Yet Beijing’s behaviour in global governance may seem incoherent or ambiguous, at best. In 
fact, it reflects an on-going struggle in how it presents itself to the world wanting, on one hand, to 
emphasize its importance, and a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international community, yet projecting 
itself as a peacefully developing country that poses no threat.4 Along these lines, China sometimes 
defines itself as a developing country, fervent member of the global South; at others, however, it 
emphasises its emerging power status with a right to decision-making, if not so much burden-sharing.  
 
In order to manoeuvre its way through the international fora in the midst of its shifting political identity, 
China has opted for formal and informal minilateral alliances. China allies with a broad spectrum of 
                                               
 
1 By regime, we understand ‘principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that govern state behaviour in specific 
areas of international relations’ (Krasner 1983:2). The choice of the term regimes vs. orders is based on a combined rational 
and normative approach by the authors of this piece when it comes to analysing international relations. 
2 Deng Xiaoping pushed forward economic development to replace ideology under his leadership. This was a move away from 
the Mao Zedong’s time when ideology defined the direction for the CCP. This was even more pronounced after the collapse of 
the USSR, when communism further lost its currency. Under the past two leaders (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) the leadership 
was also getting more professionalized and less charismatic in character in comparison to earlier leaders of the PRC.  
3 It is acknowledged that ‘rising powers’ and ‘emerging powers’ is used in the literature. For the purposes of this paper, we are 
using rising powers and emerging powers interchangeably. 
4 Robert Zoellick, former USTR representative pressured China on this point, particularly in relation to the WTO. 
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countries, often with developing and emerging ones, but sometimes also with developed countries. 
Minilateralism allows Beijing to play by the rules à la Chine, discretely stepping to the side or 
encouraging reform when convenient. In the case of climate change, China has been fundamental in 
enabling a breakthrough deal in Paris during the 2015 Conference of the Parties 21 (COP21). China 
opted for alliances with the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), with the Like-Minded 
Developing Countries on Climate Change (LMDC)5 grouping, with the US and host-state France, prior 
to the Paris COP21 summit of December 2015. The outcome was advantageous for China—structurally 
favouring a more bottom-up approach, which allows China to remain in control of its emissions targets 
and mitigation strategies. 6  The many fronts in which China is operating demonstrate Beijing’s 
leveraging strategy and how it has become skilled at playing off different countries against each other, 
to its advantage. 
 
Beijing’s pro-active behaviour and choice of a minilateral way in the international politics of climate 
change is not an isolated phenomenon. China has recently become much more engaged in global finance 
matters as well. It is not doing so by strictly following the norms or mandate of Bretton Woods’ 
institutions. Instead, Beijing has opted to play a key role in G20 minilateral negotiations, coinciding 
with its chairmanship of the institution, as well as in the creation of key new international financial 
institutions. China seeks to consolidate itself as the leading promoter of infrastructure investment 
finance, which lies at the heart of its historical approach to foreign economic assistance. These include 
the AIIB (100 billion USD), NDB (50 billion USD) and Silk Road Fund (40 billion USD) (Yang, 2016). 
In fact, China has taken a bold step forward by pushing for infrastructure financing as the core for the 
new AIIB, which has welcomed members beyond the minilateral sphere that China began its initiative 
with.  
 
The headquarters of the AIIB are in Beijing, and its current President, Jin Liqun is a Chinese national.7 
China putting down 30 percent of its base capital (29.78 billion USD), signals its strong wish to take the 
lead and challenge the institutional and normative context of the traditional economic powers, as 
embodied in the Bretton Woods system. The AIIB is structured in a manner that gives China more 
weight and influence over the institution, as best reflected in its voting system. China has a 26 percent of 
overall voting share in the AIIB, compared to its 6.11 percent in the IMF, which is a mighty 
improvement (Lee, 2016). China’s voting share of 28.7 percent is placed slightly higher than the 25 
percent needed to block any decisions in the AIIB. India is the only country following in terms of voting 
power in the AIIB, but it only has 8.3 percent of the voting share, paling in comparison to China (Weiss, 
2017). 
 
Amidst the discussions on World Bank and IMF reform, when one considers that the US has 16.58 
percent voting share in the IMF and is criticised for having too much power, the new China led AIIB 
appears to accord China with more power than the US ever had in the Bretton Woods system. The 
lending decisions in the AIIB require 75 percent of the vote (compared to 85 percent in the IMF), in 
effect providing China with ‘veto-power’. More importantly, the AIIB is the result of something much 
bigger in Beijing’s current foreign policy plans, namely the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), previously 
known as the ‘One Belt, One Road (OBOR)’. 
 
Traditionally, Beijing has avoided taking excessive international responsibilities, has refrained from 
making grand proposals and has side-tracked initiatives that would harm its interests. Thus, we see 
China’s involvement in the global finance and climate change regimes as evidence of its attempt to 
become much more visible and involved internationally. Reflecting this, both public discourse and the 
                                               
 
5 ‘The Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (LMDCs) is a spontaneous coalition of 24 countries created at 
the Bonn Climate Change Conference in May 2012. It is part of G77+China and aims to strengthen and unify that group. It 
comprises several Arab countries, as well as India, China, several emerging Asian economies and some active parties from the 
Caribbean and South America, including Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. The group, which brings together over half of the 
world’s population, has no official presidency but Malaysia acts as its spokesperson’. See ‘Paris 2015 UN Climate Change 
Conference’, available at http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/whats-the-use-of-the-country-coalitions/  
6 Kyoto Protocol was a more top-down structure with countries having less control in comparison to the Paris Agreement.  
7 See the AIIB website at: http://euweb.aiib.org/html/aboutus/President/?show=0  
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academic debate on China’s international relations after the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have underwent a 
noticeable change in tone and substance, moving away from the idea of ‘China’s rise’ and focusing 
more on ‘China’s assertiveness and confidence’ (Johnston 2013.) China’s turn towards actively 
participating and shaping minilateral arrangements may be signalling a point of no return in the nature 
of its engagement in global governance. Beijing is here to stay. However, there are several questions 
that remain unclear: What will be the form and substance of Beijing’s engagement? What agenda does 
China bring to the high table of global governance? We will seek to answer these questions by 
examining the intricacies of key institutions within the international climate change and global finance 
regimes. 
 
Minilateralism and its implications for China 
 
Minilateralism is a rather ambivalent term with a number of definitions. According to Naim (2009), 
minilateralism is characterized by bringing to the table the smallest number of countries needed to have 
the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. Implicit in this definition is the fact that this 
small number must entail one/two actors that hold substantial power in order for the intended outcome 
to materialize. In fact, Hampson and Heinbecker (2011) highlight how minilateralism is advanced 
through group interactions that usually involve the most powerful actors in the international system. 
Kahler (1992) remarks that institutions are becoming ‘minilateral’ and less universal. In the climate 
change and global finance regimes, one of the most powerful actors among the game-changing 
minilateral groupings—be it BASIC, the LMDCs or the BRICS—is China, with India, Brazil and South 
Africa lagging somewhat behind. Minilateral groupings can be offshoots of existing multilateral 
arrangements or they can represent independent entities, as is the case of BRICS. In addition, there can 
be considerable interaction between minilateral groups.8 
 
Minilateral arrangements come with a set of advantages that suit China’s negotiation style; they 
facilitate consensus-based decision-making and allow the country to retain control. Decisions taken 
following consensus take much more time but they allow for the parties to save face, which is crucial in 
Chinese negotiations. Moreover, minilateralism involves sophisticated corridor diplomacy, which very 
much fits into Beijing’s diplomatic ways. China has traditionally preferred conducting negotiations in 
bilateral or small groups, which allows the country to retain control and save face; such bilateral or 
small group negotiations often run parallel to multilateral negotiations. This allows Beijing to coordinate 
positions in multilateral settings, and find support for its negotiating positions. 
 
‘Saving face’ is a serious concern in Chinese culture, equally important for Beijing’s diplomatic conduct 
(Gries, 2004). When the country ‘loses face’, it tends to run itself into a corner and assume an inflexible 
and defensive stance, creating a stalemate that neither China nor the other countries desire, and one that 
is difficult to resolve. This was witnessed in the Permanent Court of Arbitrations’ decision on the South 
China Sea in July 2016, when China refused to accept the result, leaving no resolution in sight (Perlez, 
2016). 
 
China is not the only emerging power that has opted for minilateral arrangements. In fact, other 
emerging powers seem equally attracted to them. Their recent ascendancy makes these countries prone 
to being cautious of any external interference and to opt for small group negotiations and coalition 
building. This kind of ‘clubs’ are particularly appealing since they provide emerging countries with 
much sought means of influence on international decision-making processes. It further provides them 
with access to the high table of international politics and a stronger voice in negotiations, by enabling 
coordination with similar-minded states. Multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and the 
Bretton Woods institutions are often accused of being dominated by the traditional great [Western] 
powers. These institutions, critics argue, do not reflect the growing international leverage that emerging 
and developing countries have in the context of a global shift in the balance of power from the West to 
the East. 
                                               
 
8 BRICS was an important venue for the BASIC and policy coordination in finance, climate change and trade.  
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From a pragmatic standpoint, in a minilateral forum, decisions can be taken more effectively and 
operationalised more efficiently. Chances are that interests and agendas are more closely aligned, which 
translates into improved capacity to implement decisions. The outcome of the COP21 Paris summit 
(December  2015) is proof of this. It would not have been possible to reach an agreement, had sub-
groupings such as the preliminary ‘G2’ (China and the United States) or the LMDCs—which includes 
key BASIC members - not come about and agreed to move forward as a common front. 
 
There are, nonetheless also a number of risks involved in minilateral groupings, such as the lack of 
legitimacy and representativeness when compared to bigger fora, e.g. the G20 vs. the UN; the BASIC 
and/or LMDCs vs. the G77 + China.9 There is also the risk of exclusion of not-so-powerful players, e.g. 
low-income countries and countries with less leverage. This explains the mushrooming of sub-
groupings such as the Umbrella Group, a loose coalition of non-EU developed countries that opposes 
extending the Kyoto Protocol and was formed against the backdrop of climate change negotiations.  
 
The climate change regime epitomises well how the emergence of infinite sub-groupings has become a 
challenge in itself, since it risks spreading agendas and common objectives too thin to achieve any given 
goals. It can also incentivise swindling behaviour of countries resulting from intra-group divisions. This 
was the case of BASIC members: they fluctuated between their BASIC membership and that of the 
G77+China and the LMDCs in the framework of climate change negotiations.  This particular aspect is 
discussed in further detail in the following pages. 
 
China’s manoeuvring within climate change—implications for Beijing’s 
behaviour internationally  
 
Emerging Minilaterals in the Climate Change regime 
 
The UNFCCC has been a controversial convention from the outset. When holistic agreements on the 
environment were concluded in Stockholm (UN Conference on the Human Environment 1972), the 
environment was becoming an important issue on the UN agenda, and by Rio (UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, 1992) the North and South divide was crippling the progress of 
defining and implementing measures for sustainable development. Like most UN negotiations, the G77 
was one of the most important coalition groups for the global South, and China often aligned itself with 
this group.10  When China joined the UN in 1971, the environment was a key area where it could begin 
to partake in international negotiations. By Rio, China had become a leading voice and actor in the G77, 
helping to successfully conclude the two framework conventions—one on climate change and the other 
on bio-diversity.  
 
In the early years of the UNFCCC, China was still hitting its double digits for economic growth and was 
on the way to becoming a key economic power. By the late 1990s, China’s economic rise was 
undeniable; its comparative advantage in manufacturing had transformed its industry into the so-called 
‘Factory China’, which provided the world with its manufactured goods. As shown in Graph 1, this 
furious economic activity brought forth rising emissions; a reliance on fossil fuels making up three-
quarters of the country’s energy portfolio, and total emissions developing at a rapid rate. In order to 
ensure that China’s economic development was not capped, the negotiators for the UNFCCC identified 
with the global South to emphasize historical responsibility, placing the burden for addressing climate 
                                               
 
9 The G20 refers to the meeting of Finance Ministers and not the developing country coalition group of G20 in the WTO.  
10 The G77 and China was established in 1964 by 77 countries signing the ‘Joint Declaration of Seventy-Seven Countries’ 
issued at first session of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Although there are 132 member states, they 
have retained their original name of G77.  The G77 and China aims to promote developing country interests in UN negotiations 
and South-South cooperation. There are subgroups in the G77 – BASIC, Least Developed Countries, African Group, AOSIS, 
ALBA (Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba and Nicaragua) and OPEC. 
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change on the developed countries that had already gone through their trajectory of development and 
were deemed to be at a ripe stage to tackle climate change ‘adaptation’ and ‘mitigation’.11  
 
 
Graph 1 China’s Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Year from 1890 to 2010 (measured in thousand metric tons) 
 
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre, Fossil-Fuel CO2 emissions from the People’s Republic of 
China, available at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/prc.html 
 
Under the Kyoto regime (Kyoto Protocol), the Chinese delegation pushed for ‘common/ but 
differentiated responsibility’, with the Annex 1 (developed countries) and non-Annex 1 (developing 
countries) distinction, placing responsibility on the Annex 1 countries to finance climate change 
abatement and mitigation. As famously stated by the former lead negotiator of the Chinese delegation to 
the UNFCCC, Zhong Shukong, the ‘luxury emissions’ of the developed world, such as SUV and 
multiple cars in a household should be capped by the UNFCCC, while the ‘survival emissions’ of the 
developing world, such as buses and public transport should be allowed since development and poverty 
alleviation was a bigger priority for these countries (Warrick, 1997).12   
                                               
 
11 Adaptation refers to initiatives aimed to lessen the adverse impact of climate change, while mitigation refers to initiatives 
aimed to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gasses.   
 
12 Zhong Shukong was an active negotiator for climate change until his death in 2000.   
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The result of this was a triumph for the G77 and China. The Kyoto Protocol incorporated these 
principles with the North paying first in the form of immediate caps on emissions, while the South was 
exempted from such caps and received substantial financing and support from developed countries. 
Support received included economic incentives such as Clean Development Programme (CDM), under 
which developed countries financed emissions reduction projects in developing countries such as China. 
The Clean Development Mechanism enabled developing countries to access environmental technologies 
and know-how, while the emissions were credited back to developed countries, thus creating a so called 
‘win-win’ situation. 
 
However, the Kyoto mechanisms (Emissions Trading, Clean Development Mechanism) were far from 
perfect, raising ethical issues regarding the introduction of market mechanisms into environmental 
protection. The ‘Kyoto Firewall’ dividing the commitments of the developed and developing countries 
became a very problematic construction, particularly creating a deadlock between the global North and 
South. Emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa were not willing to cut their 
emissions without a ‘meaningful’ contribution from Annex 1 countries, having had a growth spurt in 
emissions due to their meteoric economic rise in the late 1990s and 2000s. The precise definition of this 
‘meaningful’ contribution became a focus of COP debates in the lead-up to Copenhagen in 2009 where 
an agreement to succeed Kyoto was expected to be reached.  
 
Due to their emissions size as well as their importance for reaching and implementing any future 
agreements on climate change abatement and mitigation, China and the emerging powers were 
separated from the other non-Annex 1 countries and became the focus of negotiations. This kind of 
attention made China very uncomfortable; any damper on its economic development was something 
detrimental for the survival of the CCP, whose legitimacy was very much tied to economic 
development. There were also some issues with the use of absolute emissions as the measurement of a 
country’s emissions in the UFCCC negotiations: per capita calculations were the preferred method for 
China and other developing countries, which would make the rankings for emissions quite different, 
placing China much lower in rank for emissions. 
  
In Copenhagen, former Premier Wen Jiabao gave a speech which emphasized China’s identity as a 
developing country with 150 million people below the World Bank’s poverty line of US 1.25 dollars a 
day (Wen, 2009).  
 
China has a 1.3 billion population and its per capita GDP has only exceeded 3,000 U.S. 
dollars. According to the U.N. standards, we still have 150 million people living below the 
poverty line and we therefore face the arduous task of developing the economy and 
improving people's livelihood. 
 
(Wen, 2009) 
 
Some non-Annex 1 countries, namely the emerging powers and OPEC states, intended to keep 
developing countries from committing to emissions caps, while the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS), facing an imminent existential threat from climate change, advocated the opposite. This 
created a wedge amongst the non-Annex 1 countries.13 China’s actions and the outcome in Copenhagen 
were predictable; China rounded up the emerging powers by calling a Conference in Beijing on 28 
November 2009, weeks before the Copenhagen Earth Summit. The result of these minilateral 
negotiations were the BASIC group, a loose cooperative coalition and forum for discussion for climate 
change, that held ministerial and technical level meetings three to four times a year. The coalition 
                                               
 
13 AOSIS is a coalition group of 44 low-lying, small island countries vulnerable to a-level rise. Most of the countries in AOSIS 
are in the G77, and present tensions with the other developing countries, which want to push for more developmental rights 
(AOSIS website http://aosis.org/about-aosis/) 
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resisted pressure for emissions caps from Annex I countries. It is an influential coalition with the 
BASIC countries accounting for 29 percent of global GHG emissions and 60 percent of the total annual 
GHG emissions coming from non-Annex 1 countries (Hallding, Olsson, Atteridge, Carson, Vihma, & 
Roman, 2011). 
 
There was more of an overlap of interests in the BASIC group when compared to the large, unwieldy, 
coalition group of the G77 and China (Hochstetler, 2012; Hochstetler & Manjana, 2015). China’s 
importance and impact on climate change accorded it veto power in the BASIC coalition (Filho and 
Viola 2011). The creation of the BASIC group played a key role in the outcome of the 2009 COP. The 
Copenhagen Accord was a political, non-binding agreement lacking in teeth when compared with the 
Kyoto Protocol, a legal agreement with binding commitments. The minilateral strategy of China was 
successful in stalling the climate change negotiations, with the Paris Agreement taking another six years 
to be concluded in 2015 and only coming into force on 4 November 2016.  
 
 
Copenhagen to Paris  
 
The strategy of China until Copenhagen was to associate itself with the global South by aligning with 
the G77. When China began to rise as an emerging power, it became less comfortable for the country to 
align with the G77. This was compounded with divisions within the G77 between the AOSIS, that faced 
the risk of disappearing underwater due to sea level rise, the OPEC countries and emerging powers. The 
latter wanted to avoid any constraints for their oil exports and economic development. While the BASIC 
group was very visible in Copenhagen, there was not much coordination between its members in the 
multilateral negotiations after Copenhagen, despite the existence of periodical meetings to align their 
positions. 
 
Only five years after Wen Jiabao made a speech in Copenhagen emphasizing the country‘s identity as a 
country of the global South, China signed a Climate Change agreement with the US, one of the largest 
emitters of the developed world/global North in November 2014. The US-China Climate Change 
agreement, and to a lesser extent the China-France Climate Change agreement (November 2014), while 
formally not part of the UNFCCC, were key for the successful conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 
2015. It would not be an exaggeration to state that it was only because of this US-China minilateral 
initiative, and the alignment of the US and Chinese positions during the Paris negotiations, that the 
Agreement could be concluded in 2015. This flip-flop of Chinese identity and alignment from global 
South to North, entering into minilateral agreements with some likely and unlikely partners, enabled 
China to maximise its national interests. China strategically chose its partners to suit its needs, creating a 
pattern in its behaviour during climate change negotiations.  
 
Under Trump, there is a dramatic shift of the US from being a leader to becoming an obstructionist 
laggard in the UNFCCC. On the contrary, China is an active supporter of the Paris Agreement, with Xi 
Jinping repeatedly re-affirming his support. The result is that China is now emerging as an unlikely 
‘leader’ in the global effort against climate change.  
 
Why minilaterals? China’s importance and ‘perceived’ importance  
 
China ranks 1st in emissions of greenhouse gases and is responsible for a quarter of the world’s total. 
China and India are the 1st and 3rd biggest emitters of CO2 with 28 percent and 6 percent of the global 
emissions respectively, demonstrating the important of the two countries in climate change. This stems 
from the fact that China and India are the two most populous countries, making up roughly 19 and 18 
percent of the world population, respectively.14 China together with India contribute to half of the Non-
                                               
 
14 Based on United Nations Population Division data, Countries in the World by Population (2016), World o Meters at: 
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ 
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Annex 1 emissions, which shows their significance in the non-Annex 1 developing country group, and 
by extension, in the UNFCCC. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Global Percentage of Emissions, Source: Boden, T.A., Marland, G., and Andres, R.J. (2015). National 
CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751-2011, Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, doi 
10.3334/CDIAC/00001_V2015. 
 
Moreover, China hosts more than half of UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs), one of 
the key market mechanisms introduced by the Kyoto Protocol. Under the CDM, Annex 1 (developed) 
countries could reduce their emissions by financing projects in non-Annex 1 countries, and have the 
emissions cut credited back to them. The majority of the CDMs being hosted in China attest to fact that 
the country is perceived to be important in climate change in the eyes of the Annex 1 (developed) 
countries. However, the reality is that CDM projects, which promote transfer of technology and know-
how to the non-Annex 1 host country, are directed mainly to China and not to the small African states 
that have a more pressing need for such assistance. To sum up, China’s soft power in climate change 
allows it not only leverage over the negotiations, but also substantial benefits from the CDM. 
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Figure 1: CDMs under UNFCCC by host country, Source: UNFCCC, 2014  
 
 
 
These factors make China and, to a lesser extent, India crucial actors in climate change. The two 
countries are big players in the UNFCCC but they are also most vulnerable with their coastal regions 
host to much of their economic activities. Their reliance on fossil fuels also creates challenges for 
climate change mitigation. This is in contrast to Brazil, the 7th largest emitter of CO2 (2.34 percent of 
global emissions), which has a large hydropower industry, making it more environmentally friendly 
(EcoWatch, 2015). South Africa, for its part, ranks 15th with only 1.22 percent of global CO2 emissions 
(EcoWatch, 2015).  Thus, China and India have more at stake for the success or failure of the climate 
change regime than other emerging powers. At the same time, they are the key forces behind the BASIC 
group and its influence in climate change negotiations. 
 
Pragmatism over Identity? 
 
China has traditionally aligned itself with the global South in the UNFCCC negotiations to ensure that 
its economic development is not hindered by international environmental protection agreements. While 
the decision to identify with the global South was somewhat ideological, stemming from China’s semi-
colonial history, it was also a strategic one. Alignment with the G77 made sense from a pragmatic point 
of view as the 155 developing countries of the non-Annex 1 list15 made up the majority (78 percent) of 
the current 197 members (196 countries and one regional integration organization) in the UNFCCC.16  
 
China’s position in the G77 has been adapted to reflect its ascendancy in international affairs. The 
country’s double digit economic development has led to some discomfort for China to remain in the 
developing country coalition group of the G77, particularly after the late 1990s and 2000s. There has 
been mounting pressure on China to assume a responsibility commensurate with its economic and 
military growth. It was this indirect pressure that led Beijing to enter into strategic minilaterals, first 
with the BASIC group of emerging powers  before Copenhagen, followed by the LMDCs, and the US 
and France in the lead-up to Paris. China’s international identity is a tool in this regard, as the country 
                                               
 
15 Non-Annex I countries are the developing countries from the global South.  
16 There are 21 Annex-I countries making them only 21percent of the UNFCCC total.  
Total CDM activities under the UNFCCC, 
by host country (Total 7,430)
China
India
Brazil
Vietnam
Mexico
Thailand
Malaysia
Indonesia
Others
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tactically enters into minilaterals with both the global South and the global North, to maximise its 
leverage and interests.  
 
 
China’s global finance regime  
 
Emerging minilaterals in the global finance regime 
 
As in the case of climate change, China has also sought to build on minilateral arrangements within the 
global finance regime; these, however, have epitomised in a new set of institutions, as opposed to 
mushrooming treaties and/or conventions. Moreover, it is ambiguity, uncertainty and frictions between 
existing structures and emerging actors, which characterize the current ‘interregnum’ in global finance 
(Helleiner 2010, in Huotari and Hannenmman 2014). The 2008-09 financial crisis brought to the fore 
the ongoing loss of legitimacy of the global economic regime established with the Bretton Woods 
institutions post-World War II. Emerging powers are among the disenchanted by an obsolete and 
idiosyncratic global finance regime that, till very recently, has failed to acknowledge global power and 
economic shifts.  
 
The reality is that BRICS countries, except India, have all set up sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and are 
keen to internationalise their multinational companies (Huotari and Hannemann 2014). In fact, the 
BRICS have become the main source of investment among themselves and in low-income countries 
(LICs) according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (UNCTAD, 2015). The 
establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) is another step forward in consolidating emerging 
economies as global investors in both developing and developed countries.  
 
BRICS’ lending has further become a source of pressure on - and potential alternative to - an 
international financial system where the traditional powers have been very slow to respond to both the 
political demands and economic needs of developing countries (Hochstetler 2014). There has been 
much literature and discussion on the absence of transparency, conditionalities and political 
requirements on the part of emerging donors’ funding, in contrast to OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) donor members.17  
 
According to Mwase & Yang (2012), BRICs’ financing, with the exception of Russia, is based on a 
model of ‘win-win’ or ‘mutual benefit’. Moreover, the focus has often been on productive activities, 
such as the infrastructure sector, and on the micro-sustainability of individual projects (Mwase & Yang, 
2012). Chinese foreign aid, for example, does not include a focus on democracy, good governance or 
human rights and does not impose these standards on benefactors. This is done in an attempt to preserve 
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and as a means to circumvent corruption. Instead, 
Beijing emphasises the importance of stimulating economic growth and implementing a development 
model based on each country’s specific requirements and circumstances similar to their experience 
under the ‘Beijing Consensus’ or the Chinese model of development.  
 
We see therefore that there has been much focus on the conditions attached to donor funding, less so to 
the actual target sectors of that funding. In the eyes of Beijing and emerging donors, more broadly, 
traditional donors have failed to invest enough in infrastructure throughout the past decade, with the 
exception of the ADB. Instead the trend of the traditional donors has been to focus on human (health, 
education and social protection) and sustainable development (agriculture, water and sanitation). 
Infrastructure remains an insufficiently addressed need (Chin, 2014). The World Bank estimated in 
2014 that the global demand for infrastructure is at 1-1.5 trillion USD annually above current 
investment levels. In the Asia Pacific alone, the ADB forecasts that this figure is USD 750 billion 
                                               
 
17 OECD donors follow the guidelines of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) whereby both aid donors and 
recipients must comply with a number of requirements. 
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through to 2020, to meet the ‘required level’ of infrastructure investment (Asian Development Bank, 
2015). 
 
This has partly to do with the decline in overall private sector investment in infrastructure, which 
explains the World Bank Group’s increase in this sector since 2011. Before that, the focus was on 
agricultural development, education, energy, health, and transport projects (Chin, 2016). The World 
Bank aims to gradually counterbalance the infrastructure financing of the BRICS, despite the fact that it 
is still recovering economically post-2008-09 financial crisis. 
 
It was during the 2010 Seoul Summit that the G20, currently one of the leading minilateral 
arrangements in global finance, emphasised that ‘gaps in infrastructure, including with respect to 
energy, transport, communications, water and regional infrastructure, are significant bottlenecks to 
increasing and maintaining growth in many developing countries’ (G20 Seoul Summit, 2010). African 
leaders were also among those that have pressed the G20 to seriously consider the need for additional 
financing in infrastructure building in developing countries. According to Chin (2014:368), however, it 
was as early as November 2008, during the first G20 leaders’ summit in Washington D.C., when the 
then Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh ‘emphasized that part of the globally coordinated 
response to the crisis should include major infrastructure investment to drive global economic growth’. 
Despite many commitments, little happened thereafter. Instead, as a result of the 2008-09 financial 
crisis, the G20’s focus was very much on macroeconomic imbalances, that is, on liberalization measures 
and institutional adjustments of developing countries. This agenda resembled that of Bretton Woods 
institutions, not so much one of an emerging minilateral arrangement.   
 
 
What implications for China specifically? 
 
So, how does China fit into the emerging global finance regime? How is Beijing seeking to acquire 
additional strategic responsibility in global finance?  
 
Beijing sees the emergence of new IFIs as an additional channel beyond the IMF and the World Bank to 
promote its own form of development co-operation assistance. The idea is not for these new institutions 
to replace the Bretton Woods framework, a US-led regime in which China has thrived and with which it 
is interdependent (Lagerkvist 2015). Instead, these new IFIs are seen as a complement through which 
Beijing can continue to provide development co-operation assistance, which it brands as ‘foreign 
economic assistance’ (FEA).  
 
FEA is considered as one element, among others, within China’s economic statecraft; the latter includes 
official loans at commercial rates, export credits and suppliers’ credits (Information Office of the State 
Council (PRC), 2014). Beijing frames its FEA as South-South cooperation based on the following 
principles: mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits and a win-win situation 
(Information Office of the State Council (PRC), 2014). This is very much in line with the doctrine of the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, at the heart of Beijing’s foreign policy (Duara, 2009).18 China 
traditionally shies away from establishing a hegemonic relationship with less developed countries and 
seeks a partnership between developing countries instead. In fact, China still defines itself as ‘the 
world’s largest developing country’ (Information Office of the State Council (PRC), 2014). This was 
also the case in its relationship with other actors involved in climate change negotiations, as explored 
above. 
 
In the Chinese context, foreign economic assistance figures are confusing and contradictory, often hard 
to discern from foreign direct investment (FDI). This has partly to do with the prevailing political 
                                               
 
18 The treaty is known as the Agreement between the Republic of India and the PRC on Trade and Intercourse between India 
and the Tibet Region of China, or Panchasheela (1954). It eventually became the founding pillar for Chinese foreign policy, 
valid to this day.   
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aversion towards excessive transparency and also the difficulty of dividing state and private investment 
(Shambaugh, 2013). Chinese aid flows were first made officially public by the Chinese government as 
late as during April 2011 in its first White Paper on Foreign Aid; the second one followed in 2014.  The 
secrecy in numbers is also linked to China’s financing packages or its so-called ‘Angola-mode’ of 
financing where it is virtually impossible to distinguish between bilateral aid and suppliers/construction 
contracts (Mlachila and Tabeke, 2011:11). 
 
According to the ‘Angola mode’ of financing, the bulk of which has been undertaken during the first 
decade of the 21st Century, Beijing establishes framework agreements with countries to undertake a 
development project in exchange for access rights to natural resources, such as oil or minerals. No 
money is used in the process. Instead, the Chinese company that has been awarded the construction 
project further acquires the right to exploration and/or production. Bräutigam and Gallagher (2014) refer 
to it as ‘commodity-backed’ or ‘resource-secured’ package loans. They are rarely concessional, given 
on a low interest rate loan. According to this same source, ‘more than 50 per cent of Chinese finance in 
Africa and Latin America is in the form of commodity-backed loans’ (Bräutigam and Gallagher 
2014:348).  
 
Another key source of Chinese financing belongs to the so-called ‘other official flows’ (OOF), which 
includes Beijing’s medium and long-term export credits. This is more important than its official 
development assistance (Huotari and Hanemann 2014). In contrast, what Beijing terms as foreign 
assistance, was based on grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans from 2010 to 2012 
(Information Office of the State Council (PRC), 2014).   
 
China stands out among emerging investors, having become a global leader in infrastructure investment 
finance. Beijing is not trying to usurp the system but rather to challenge aspects that discriminate against 
it. China is in the process of creating new arrangements that more accurately reflect its own conception 
of its place in the world. Moreover, despite its well-known role as global investor in Africa and Latin 
America, Beijing has now chosen to proportionately expand its economic investment in its 
neighbourhood and developed regions (Mlachila & Tabeke, 2011). 
 
Bilaterally, China operates via the China Development Bank (CDB) and China Eximbank. Through the 
latter it provides medium-term strategic financing, usually as part of China’s five-year plans (Bräutigam 
and Gallagher 2014). For China, the so-called BRICS Development Bank [New Development Bank] is a 
way to secure resources, build stronger ties with developing countries and redirect its foreign currency 
reserves for productive purposes (Chin 2014). Without China, the success of the NDB is questionable, 
particularly from a financial resource standpoint. Not coincidentally, its headquarters have been set up 
in Shanghai. The so-called BRICS Bank is less significant for Beijing’s quest for strategic responsibility 
than the establishment of the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund (SRF).  
 
 
AIIB and BRI 
 
The establishment of the Beijing-based AIIB constitutes a crucial stepping stone for China in two ways: 
(i) as a means to acquire broader and durable responsibility in global economic governance; (ii) as a 
way to secure financing of infrastructure building throughout a broad range of countries, not only in 
LICs. The AIIB defines itself as a multilateral development bank with 56 founding member countries, 
including several traditional Western powers [France, Germany, Italy and the UK], despite the lobbying 
against it by the United States (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2015).  Like in the case of the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), at least 75 percent of the votes have been reserved for Asian 
members at the AIIB. This clear regional influence over the AIIB implies that it will run according to 
Chinese and, by extension, Asian multilateralism. China constitutes the largest shareholder with 30.34 
percent of shares (Chin, 2016).  
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The AIIB further aims to achieve a more lenient and effective management system based on two boards, 
both non-resident. The larger Board of Governors shall delegate the bulk of its management and 
decision-making processes to a smaller Board of Directors and the bank president. By doing so, the 
AIIB aims to achieve as much of an effective and satisfactory service as possible in the eyes of its 
members and borrowers. Part of the frustration of recipient governments towards the World Bank stems 
from its prolonged project appraisals, which has delayed World Bank infrastructure project approvals by 
years (Chin 2016). It is yet to be seen how the Chinese will go about the avoidance of ‘conditionalities’ 
for AIIB loans and ‘moral hazard’ on loan repayments. The challenge of how to allocate the bank’s 
funds to the most appropriate projects in the least amount of time and ensuring repayment remains (Chin 
2016). 
 
The AIIB’s first Article of Agreement focuses on the wish to ‘foster economic development, sustainable 
economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in 
infrastructure and other productive sectors;…’ (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2015). The 
notion of ‘infrastructure connectivity’ is nothing new in Chinese foreign policy. In fact, it lies at the 
heart of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). BRI’s aim is to increase trade and investment along China’s 
periphery by funding and building infrastructure projects; it is part of its so-called ‘peripheral 
diplomacy’. BRI could well use substantial financing from the AIIB in the coming years or decades. 
According to Callahan (2016), the AIIB, combined with the BRICS New Development Bank and the 
Silk Road Fund were all designed by China to fund BRI.  
 
The initiative goes much beyond mere economic purposes: it signals Beijing’s wish to bring its 
neighbouring countries into a network of economic, political, cultural, and security relations with China 
at the centre (Callahan 2016). Thus, it reverberates old notions of China’s historical Silk Road, 
including some ancient maritime routes between China and Europe, as well as the Silk Road’s known 
trails overland. There is no official number of countries that lie along BRI, it being rather amorphous, 
but it is estimated to be a figure around sixty (The Economist, 2016). Beijing aims to spend a total of 
USD 4 trillion in BRI countries, with 900 deals already under way (The Economist, 2016).  
 
Some have branded it as China’s ‘Marshall Plan’; it lies at the heart of Mr. Xi’s foreign policy and his 
plans to expand not only Beijing’s commercial interests, but also its soft power. The BRI route will 
likely contribute to increasing Beijing’s much sought international status and recognition for a new 
place in the world. It is also part of a grand strategy where China aims to use connectivity projects to 
socialize Asia and Europe into its view of global order, which entails improving the world through its 
ideas, aspirations and norms. Beijing dreams to achieve the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ 
(Callahan, 2016). 
 
We see, therefore, that the AIIB epitomises much more than just another minilateral [vs. multilateral] 
development bank. For one, it is very much China’s indication to an increasingly leading role in 
regional/global economic governance. For two, it epitomises Beijing’s current foreign policy ambitions, 
which may encompass challenging the dominant normative world order and building a new one 
altogether. China’s promotion of new international institutions and initiatives is not in vain. The global 
finance regime gives us a fabulous example of how these new minilateral institutions are providing 
China with the global leeway that it was looking for, by discreetly pulling strings to its advantage; very 
much global finance à la Chine.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined a wide array of examples of China’s à la carte multilateralism, which have 
epitomised in the form of minilateral arrangements and institutions. Minilateralism allows China to pick 
and choose its ‘allies’ according to the issue area and context, and in order to suit its own needs. China’s 
selective choice of international alliances, with a view to growingly influence the global agenda, has 
become visible in the fields of climate change and global finance.  
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These minilateral strategies are particularly obvious in a global finance regime where China has much to 
gain. Aside from its complex model of international development finance that interweaves foreign aid 
with FDI flows, Beijing is asserting its economic approach by reforming and creating alternative 
institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank and the AIIB. Both of the latter tie in well with 
Beijing’s international financial interests and complex combination of public and commercial banking 
arrangements.  
 
In the case of the climate regime, Beijing wants to mitigate the effects of climate change without risking 
slowing down economic development. China has eventually opted to encourage the reform of the 
UNFCCC in order to reach an agreement better suited to its climate change concerns (i.e. 2015 Paris 
Agreement). Minilateral arrangements with the BASIC and LMDCs, and in alliance with the US, 
proved crucial to reaching a multilateral consensus. A renewed China-US alliance on climate change, 
however, is hard to imagine following the coming to power of the Trump Administration.  This goes to 
show the unpredictability of minilateral arrangements.  
 
In both cases, Beijing has shown an interest and actually managed to become a crucial international 
player and stakeholder.  Not coincidentally, both climate change and development finance lie at the core 
of Beijing’s national interest. Motivations aside, Beijing proved crucial in recent negotiations on climate 
change as part of the Paris Agreement. Similarly, China’s BRI and the creation of the AIIB that has 
gone beyond the scope of ‘Asia’ in membership, show that it can influence global trends in international 
regimes.19  
 
This choice, however, is selective. Beijing does not show the same interest in sensitive political issues 
such as domestic political reform or human rights. To China, these are ‘internal affairs’ thus, it will not 
actively seek to take leadership in such areas. This selective interest in global issues lies at the core of its 
global role thus far. Yet, as constructivists would put it, this international interface does not go one way 
only. China has become a global influencer; so will it be influenced by global norms at domestic level. 
How and to what extent, remains the question.  Key to global governance is that Beijing’s more or less 
coherent form of minilateralism, despite its peculiarities, has actively brought China into the multilateral 
system beyond its pivotal role in international trade or the UN Security Council. Changing times.   
 
Beijing is now part and parcel of global governance in its own minilateral way, à la Chine. China is 
seeking to maximise its interests via minilateral arrangements and institutions, which reform the status 
quo or, alternatively, create new paths that better reflect Chinese interests and ideas.  Beijing’s much 
sought for international relevance in both climate change and global finance is finally bearing its fruits. 
Thus, minilateralism constitutes not only a strategic challenge to the existing institutions but also a new 
normative leeway with global outreach. Only time will tell whether Beijing’s version of global finance 
and climate change will become the ‘new normal’ within global governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
19 According to the AIIB, membership has reached 70 members (July 2017). See:  AIIB website, https://www.aiib.org/en/news-
events/news/2017/20170323_001.html 
Yuka Kobayashi and Amaia Sanchez  
 
 
16 
REFERENCES 
 
Asian Development Bank. (2015, May 30). Public Private Partnerships Key to Meeting Asia's 
$8 Trillion Infrastructure Needs - Study. Retrieved February 2017 from Asian Development 
Bank: http://www.adb.org/news/public-private-partnerships-key-meeting-asias-8-trillion-
infrastructure-needs-study 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. (2015). Articles of Agreement. Beijing: Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
Brautigam, D., & Gallagher, K. (2014). Bartering Globalization: China's Commodity-backed 
Finance in Africa and Latin America. Global Policy , Vol. 5 (3). 
Callahan, W. A. (2016). China's Belt and Road Initiative and the New Eurasian Order2016. 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). 
Chin, G. T. (2016). Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Governance Innovation and 
Prospects. Global Governance , Vol. 22 (1). 
cogitAsia. (2015, July 7). By the Numbers: China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB). Retrieved February 2017 from Center for Strategic & International Studies - cogitAsia 
blog: https://www.cogitasia.com/by-the-numbers-china-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-
bank-aiib/ 
Duara, P. (2009). The Global and Regional in China's Nation-Formation. Oxford: Routledge. 
EcoWatch. (2015, June 24). Top 10 Greenhouse Gas Emitters: Find out which countries are 
most responsble for climate change. Retrieved February 2017 from EcoWatch: 
http://www.ecowatch.com/top-10-greenhouse-gas-emitters-find-out-which-countries-are-most-
respo-1882054580.html 
G20 Seoul Summit. (2010). Multi-year Action Plab on Development. Seoul. 
Gries, P. (2004). China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Hallding, K., Olsson, M., Atteridge, A., Carson, M., Vihma, A., & Roman, M. (2011). Together 
Alone: Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC). Stockholm Environment Institute. 
Hampson, F. O., & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The "New" Multilateralism of the Twenty-First 
Century. Global Governance , Vol. 17. 
Helleiner, E. (2010). A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007-2008 Crisis and the Future of 
Global Finance. International Affairs , Vol. 86 (3). 
Hochstetler, K. (2014). Development Banks of the Developing World: Nature, Origins and 
Consequences. Global Policy , Vol. 5 (3). 
Hochstetler, K. (2012). The G77, BASIC and global climate governance: a new era in 
multilateral environmental negotiations. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) , 
Vol. 55. 
Hochstetler, K., & Manjana, M. (2015). responsibilities in Transition: Emerging Powers in 
Climate Change Negotiations. Global Governance , Vol. 21 (2). 
Huotari, M., & Hanemann, T. (2014). Emerging Powers and Change in the Global Financial 
Orer. Global Policy , Vol. 5 (3). 
Information Office of the State Council (PRC). (2014, July 10). China's Foreign Aid. Retrieved 
February 2017 from Xinhuanet: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
07/10/c_133474011.htm 
Kahler, M. (1992). Multilateralism with small and large numbers. International Organisation , 
Vol. 46 (3). 
Krasner, S. (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Lagerkvist, J. (2015). The Ordoliberal Turn? Getting China and Global Economic Governance 
Right. Global Affairs , Vol. 1 (4-5). 
Lee, N. (2016). Should the West Embrace the AIIB? London: Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI). 
Mlachila, M., & Tabeke, M. (2011). FDI from BRICS to LICs: Emerging Growth Driver? 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper . 
Mwase, N., & Yang, Y. (2012). BRIC's Philosophies for Development Financing and Their 
Implications for LICs. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper . 
Lau China Institute Policy Paper Series, Issue 6 
 
 
17 
Naim, M. (2009). Minilateralism. Foreign Policy , Vol. 173, 135-136. 
Perlez, J. (2016, July 12). Tribunal Rejects Beijing's Claims in the South China Sea. Retrieved 
February 2017 from The New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-
philippines.html?_r=0 
Shambaugh, D. (2013). China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: oxford University 
Press. 
The Economist. (2016, July 2). Our bulldozers, our rules. Retrieved February 2017 from The 
Economist: http://www.economist.com/news/china/21701505-chinas-foreign-policy-could-
reshape-good-part-world-economy-our-bulldozers-our-rules 
UNCTAD. (2015). Foreign Direct Investment: Inward and Outward Flows and Stock, Annual 
1970-2015. United States Conference on Trade and Development. 
UNFCC. (2014). Total CDM activities under the UNFCC by host country. United Nations 
Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC). 
Warrick, J. (1997, December 7). Senior Ministers Arriving in Japan to Try To Salvage Climate 
Summit. Retrieved February 2017 from Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/climate/stories/clim120797.htm 
Weiss, Martin (2017, February 3) Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Congressional 
Research Service Report, 7-5700, R44754 CRS online: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44754.pdf 
Wen, J. (2009, December 19). Chinese premier's (Wen Jiabao) address at Copengagen 
Climate Change Summit. Retrieved February 2017 from People's Daily Online: 
http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/6846795.html 
Yang, J. (2016). China's New Development Bank and Infrastructure-led Growth. Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
